Empiricism and Realism Reconciled in Agazzi’s Conception of Scientific Objectivity
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.56550/d.3.1.2Keywords:
scientific objectivity, logical empiricism, realism of entities, realism of properties, realistic interpretation of quantum mechanicsAbstract
Evandro Agazzi has shown the possibility of a reconciliation between logical empiricism and realism through the proposal of his conception of scientific objectivity, which replaces the notion of entity with that of object, conceived as a structured set of properties. This conception, on the one hand, has been developed from a more empiricist perspective, according to which the reality of the object is shifted to one of its predictable properties, and on the other hand, has produced his fruitful criticism of the orthodox interpretation of quantum mechanics and his demand for a realist interpretation based on the introduction of new non-classical concepts.
References
Alai, M., Buzzoni, M., and Tarozzi, G., eds. (2015). Science Between Truth and Ethical Responsibility: Evandro Agazzi in the Contemporary Scientific and Philosophical Debate. Springer, Berlin.
Alai, M. (2009). “Il realismo di Evandro Agazzi”, in Il realismo scientifico di Evandro Agazzi, Isonomia, special issue ed. by M. Alai, pp. 77-96.
Agazzi, E. (2014). “Realism of properties and realism of entities” in Gino Tarozzi Philosopher of Physics, V. Fano ed., Franco Angeli. Milan, pp. 22-32.
Agazzi, E. (2014) Scientific Objectivity and Its Contexts, Springer, Berlin.
Agazzi, E. (1997). “Thought and ontology: the meaning of a correlation”, in Thought and ontology, M. Sainsbury ed., Franco Angeli, Milan, pp. 13-22.
Agazzi, E. (1988). “Waves, particles, and complementarity”, in The Nature of Quantum Paradoxes: Italian Studies in the Foundations and Philosophy of Modern Physics, G. Tarozzi and A. van der Merwe eds., Kluwer, Dordrecht, pp. 53-74
Agazzi, E. (1979). “Proposta per una nuova caratterizzazione dell’oggettività scientifica”, in Problemi di epistemologia contemporanea, E. Agazzi ed, Itinerari, Lanciano, pp. 31-61.
Agazzi, E. (1969). Temi e problemi di filosofia della fisica, Manfredi, Milan.
Ayer, A. J. (1934). “Demonstration of the Impossibility of Metaphysics”, Mind, 171, 43, pp. 335-345.
Carnap, R. (1967). The Logical Structure of the World, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Carnap, R. (1963). “Replies and systematic expositions” in The philosophy of Rudolf Carnap, P. A. Schilpp ed., Open Court, LaSalle.
Selleri, F. (1971). “Realism and the Wave-Function of Quantum Mechanics”, in Foundation of Quantum Mechanics, B. d’Espagnat ed., Academic Press, New York.
Selleri, F. (1969). “On the Wave Function in Quantum Mechanics”, in Lettere Nuovo Cimento, 1, 17, pp. 908-910.
Tarozzi, G. (1981), “On the essential Role of the Realist Hypothesis in All Derivations of EPR-Type Paradoxes”, Epistemologia, 4, pp. 407-422.
Tarozzi, G (1980-81), “On the Relevance of the Realist Assumption in the Proof of Bell’s Inequality”, in Mem. Acc. Scienze, Lettere e Arti di Modena, 6, 22-23; pp. 80-86.
Tarozzi, G. (1980), “Realism as a meaningful philosophical hypothesis”, in Mem. Acc. Scienze Bologna, 13, 7, pp. 89-98.
