Distinctio: Journal of Intersubjective Studies

Kant’s Experiments of Reason and Thought Experiments in Philosophy

Marco Buzzoni — 2026-03-24

Kant did not distinguish between thought experiments (TEs) and real world experiments, nor did he use the German term “Gedankenexperiment”. But many aspects of Kant’s thought are related to the concept of TE, and especially “the experiments of reason” (Experimente der Vernunft), which are the distinguishing feature of transcendental arguments in philosophy as compared with the mathematical and empirical sciences. The first part of this paper reconstructs the Kantian concept of “experiments of reason”. In the second part, a functional account of Kant’s a priori is defended and contrasted with Ørsted’s first Kantian interpretation of TEs. The entirely functional view of the a priori leads to an account of TEs in philosophy which is characterized by the following four features: 1) transcendental arguments, interpreted as philosophical TEs, are exemplifications of counterfactual reasoning that are expressions of the unlimited criticism typical of philosophy; 2) as far as their content is concerned, they depend entirely on information from ‘outside’, i.e. from common life experience and the empirical sciences, and it is this content that, albeit with respect to the conditions of possibility, grounds the criterion of their internal consistency; 3) apart from the reversal of the direction of enquiry, there is no difference in principle between the special methods of reasoning adopted in scientific and philosophical TEs (any such difference could only be based on a material conception of the a priori); 4) both philosophy and philosophical TEs have in the last analysis only a critical or negative task, that of denouncing all attempts to reduce the human person to categories or concepts derived, explicitly or implicitly, from empirical reality (whether natural or cultural).

Is EU law positive cosmopolitan right à la Kant?

Bertjan Wolthuis — 2026-03-24

The question raised in this article is whether EU law is positive cosmopolitan right in Kant’s sense. If it is, it could be viewed as a contribution to Kant’s project of ‘perpetual peace.’ The conclusion of this article is that EU law is not positive cosmopolitan right. The main reason is that cosmopolitan right is limited to the right of travellers to be treated peacefully by foreign states. EU law accomplishes much more than that. EU member states have agreed by treaty to host each other’s nationals, who thereby have attained the status of guests in foreign EU member states. The implication of this is that EU law qualifies as hospitality right or ‘Gastrecht,’ as Kant calls it (AK 8:358), which is a right that can be acquired by treaty, whereas cosmopolitan right—which specifies the innate right of human beings and states to be on Earth—is limited to the conditions of hospitality, as Kant writes in Zum ewigen Frieden. This means that the European Union fulfils much more than a requirement of peace as understood by Kant. Its treaties are ‘wohltätiger Verträge’ (AK 8:358), fulfilling requirements of integration between the participating states and their nationals.

The Idea of the European Union Under the Light of Kant’s Political Philosophy

Theodoros Skalidakis — 2026-03-24

The present paper examines, in a historical and systematic manner, the fundamental principles of Kantian philosophy that have contributed and continue to inspire the idea of the European Union, with particular emphasis placed primarily on the definitive articles of Perpetual Peace. Kant presents his vision of creating a federalism of free states, guaranteed by republican institutions, which alludes to the current European Union. He also emphasizes the importance of hospitality through encouraging inclusive policies. Furthermore, it is important to note that by enshrining the legal protection of freedom of speech, he aims to uphold and reinforce political ties, safeguard human rights, and facilitate a free exchange of ideas. In brief, Kant argues that establishing an ideal political constitution is contingent upon resolving the issue of legal relations between states. Thus, the former cannot be successfully addressed without first resolving the latter.

Dissent and Unity in Metaphilosophy

Michael Lewin — 2026-03-24

Statements about philosophy in the history of philosophy and in recent metaphilosophical debates depend on first-order philosophical commitments and backgrounds, which poses both a threat and a chance for metaphilosophy as a discipline. The article aims to provide a current picture of metaphilosophy and its possible future design. It explores the problem of first-order philosophical preconceptions in metaphilosophy and suggests a strategy for the further disciplinary development of metaphilosophy. At first, it points at the problem via analysis of Camus’, Husserl’s, and Carnap’s implicit and Rescher’s, Williamson’s, and Fraisopi’s explicit metaphilosophical views. Neither a universal account of philosophy nor a neutral metaphilosophy are in sight. Nevertheless, as the article shows next, a descriptive perspective on existing contributions reveals certain continuity and disciplinary structure in metaphilosophy regarding its subject matter, placement, and existing topics. A complementary normative perspective that demands philosophy-oriented metaphilosophy focusing on inclusivity and universality can lead to more effective discourse formations, problem-solving, and knowledge maximization in this discipline.

THE CONCEPT OF TRUTH AS PRESENTED BY JOHN (8:32) IN LIGHT OF TRUTH AND CONSCIENCE AS DISCUSSED IN THE ENCYCLICAL VERITATIS SPLENDOR

Arkadiusz Krasicki — 2026-03-24

Given the extraordinary endangerment of truth, freedom, and moral action by subjectivism, individualism, and relativism in the contemporary world, the need has been recognized to recall the source of truth, freedom, and morality, which is provided by Pope John Paul II’s encyclical Veritatis Splendor. The purpose of this paper is to show how the teachings from the encyclical can be applied to the current moral dilemmas facing contemporary society, especially the relativization of truth, and to contribute to the spread of understanding of Christian values and their importance for the individual and society. Therefore, this paper provides a more extensive analysis of the encyclical, as well as its connection to John’s theology of truth. The paper deals in detail with the concept of truth in both contexts, analyzing biblical references, philosophical interpretations, and theological discussions. At the very beginning, the central role of truth in the Christian faith and its connection to human freedom is emphasized. This is followed by a detailed analysis of the historical development of the concept of truth, including the Hebrew and Greek views of truth, and John’s theology of truth. Particular attention is paid to the interpretation of the key verse from the Gospel of John: “You will know the truth, and the truth will set you free”. The second part of the paper is devoted to an analysis of the relationship between truth and freedom and truth and conscience in the encyclical. The aim of the paper is to gain a deeper understanding of the content and significance of the encyclical for the Church, as well as to consider how the teachings from the encyclical, and John’s Gospel, can be applied to the challenges facing contemporary society.

The enduring legacy of Kant’s philosophy

Jure Zovko — 2026-03-24